

expected to exceed the expected benefits;

(2) Procedures have been established for conducting the award-fee evaluation;

(3) The award-fee board has been established; and

(4) An individual above the level of the contracting officer approved the fixed-price-award-fee incentive.

[62 FR 12696, Mar. 17, 1997]

#### **16.405 Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.**

See 16.301 for requirements applicable to all cost-reimbursement contracts, for use in conjunction with the following subsections.

[48 FR 42219, Sept. 19, 1983. Redesignated at 62 FR 12696, Mar. 17, 1997]

#### **16.405–1 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.**

(a) *Description.* The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for the initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. This contract type specifies a target cost, a target fee, minimum and maximum fees, and a fee adjustment formula. After contract performance, the fee payable to the contractor is determined in accordance with the formula. The formula provides, within limits, for increases in fee above target fee when total allowable costs are less than target costs, and decreases in fee below target fee when total allowable costs exceed target costs. This increase or decrease is intended to provide an incentive for the contractor to manage the contract effectively. When total allowable cost is greater than or less than the range of costs within which the fee-adjustment formula operates, the contractor is paid total allowable costs, plus the minimum or maximum fee.

(b) *Application.* (1) A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is appropriate for services or development and test programs when—

(i) A cost-reimbursement contract is necessary (see 16.301–2) and

(ii) A target cost and a fee adjustment formula can be negotiated that

are likely to motivate the contractor to manage effectively.

(2) The contract may include technical performance incentives when it is highly probable that the required development of a major system is feasible and the Government has established its performance objectives, at least in general terms. This approach may also apply to other acquisitions, if the use of both cost and technical performance incentives is desirable and administratively practical.

(3) The fee adjustment formula should provide an incentive that will be effective over the full range of reasonably foreseeable variations from target cost. If a high maximum fee is negotiated, the contract shall also provide for a low minimum fee that may be a zero fee or, in rare cases, a negative fee.

(c) *Limitations.* No cost-plus-incentive-fee contract shall be awarded unless all limitations in 16.301–3 are complied with.

[48 FR 42219, Sept. 19, 1983. Redesignated at 62 FR 12696, Mar. 17, 1997, as amended at 62 FR 44815, Aug. 22, 1997]

#### **16.405–2 Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.**

(a) *Description.* A cost-plus-award-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of (1) a base amount fixed at inception of the contract and (2) an award amount that the contractor may earn in whole or in part during performance and that is sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in such areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost-effective management. The amount of the award fee to be paid is determined by the Government's judgmental evaluation of the contractor's performance in terms of the criteria stated in the contract. This determination and the methodology for determining the award fee are unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the Government.

(b) *Application.* (1) The cost-plus-award-fee contract is suitable for use when—

(i) The work to be performed is such that it is neither feasible nor effective